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The evaluation of each alternative with respect to each criterion may be imperfect and is
provided by one or several experts. We model each imperfect evaluation as a basic belief
assignment (BBA). In order to rank the BBAs characterizing the performances of the actions
according to each criterion, a new concept called RBBD and based on the comparison of
these BBAs to ideal or nadir BBAs is proposed. This is performed using belief distances that
measure the dissimilarity of each BBA to the ideal or nadir BBAs. A model inspired by Xu
et al.’s method is also proposed and illustrated by a pedagogical example.
 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Evidence theory [18], also called Dempster–Shafer theory or belief functions theory, is a convenient framework for mod-
eling imperfect data and for combining information. This formalism has been widely used in many ﬁelds such as the clas-
siﬁcation [10], the data mining [25], the multicriteria decision analysis [2,4,5,23,29], etc. Within the latter ﬁeld, authors
generally distinguish three main problems: the choice, the sorting and the ranking [17].
The ranking problem refers to the ordering of a set of actions evaluated on several criteria in a partial or a total preorder.
Within this context, evidence theory has been used for modeling three ranking procedures: Utkin’s approach [23,24], the DS/
AHP method [1–3] and the evidential reasoning algorithm [29–31]. The ﬁrst approach allows to deal with comparisons of
groups of actions and then to deduce a ranking based on the computation of the belief and plausibility functions of each
alternative or of the possible rankings. The second method is an extension of the AHP (Analytic Hierarchy Process) approach
which considers verbal judgements given by the decision maker on groups of actions compared to the actions set on each
criterion. The third method is a procedure that considers imperfect evaluations of the actions on a set of ordinal criteria mod-
eled by belief structures. However, the main drawback of this method is that the belief structures expressing the perfor-
mances of the actions are deﬁned using the same set of assessment grades on all the criteria. This can be not possible in
some situations. Indeed, the decision maker can prefer to consider a set of assessment grades for each criterion rather than
the same set for all the criteria.
In what follows, we will propose another ranking model based on evidence theory in a context different to those consid-
ered in Utkin’s approach, the DS/AHP method and the evidential reasoning algorithm. We consider ranking problems where. All rights reserved.
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assessment grades set used to evaluate the actions is not the same for all the criteria as in the evidential reasoning approach,
i.e., each criterion has its own set of evaluation grades. Moreover, we assume that the experts agree on these sets and that the
evaluations of the actions are imperfect. One of the main sources of this imperfection is the subjectiveness of the human
behavior. For instance, in a problem of personnel recruiting, an expert may hesitate between two or more successive assess-
ments grades when evaluating a candidate. He may be sure that this candidate has ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘very good’’ communication
skills without being able to reﬁne his judgment.
Information provided by several experts about the evaluation of an action on a given criterion has to be combined in order
to reach a collective evaluation of this action that synthesizes the experts’ opinions. Evidence theory offers several tools that
allow combining the information issued from several experts such as Dempster’s rule [7,18] and the normalized cautious
rule [8]. These rules can be solutions for the aggregation of the experts’ opinions in our problem. However, we will show
that these combination operators do not usually respect the unanimity property which is a natural condition of an aggrega-
tion operator.
In this work, we will propose a model inspired by Xu et al.’s [26] that addresses ranking problems in the context described
above. The imperfect evaluations will be modeled by evidential functions called BBAs (Basic Belief Assignment). Moreover,
we will propose a new concept called RBBD (Ranking BBAs based on Belief Distances) that permits to obtain partial and total
rankings of the evaluations on each criterion. We will show that this approach is coherent with the ﬁrst belief dominance
[4,6] which is a procedure allowing pairwise comparisons between the BBAs. We will also show that using the ﬁrst belief
dominance to rank alternatives can lead to poor results since an important number of incomparable BBAs can be induced.
We will prove that this number is usually superior or equal to the one obtained by the RBBD concept which constitutes
understandably an interesting advantage for the RBBD with regard to the ﬁrst belief dominance. Finally, we will suggest
in our model inspired by Xu et al.’s another manner for aggregating the different experts’ opinions in order to avoid the
drawback of Dempster’s and the normalized cautious rules mentioned previously.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we introduce the key concepts of evidence theory, then the notion of RBBD
is presented in Section 3 and a model inspired by Xu et al.’s method is proposed in Section 4. The model is illustrated by a
pedagogical example in Section 5.
2. Evidence theory: some concepts
Evidence theory has been initially introduced Arthur Dempster in 1967 [7] and has been later developed by Glenn Shafer
in 1976 as a general framework for modeling uncertainty [18]. This theory has been proposed as a generalization of the sub-
jective probability theory and as a model that allows representing the total ignorance case. It has been also the starting point
of many models such as the transferable belief model [20]. In this section, we will recall the basic concepts of this theory that
are necessary to understand the rest of the paper.
2.1. Knowledge model
Basically, the imperfection in data within evidence theory is modeled by a BBA. This function is deﬁned on a ﬁnite set of
mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses called the frame of discernment. Let H be this set and 2H be the set of all
subsets of H. A BBA [20] is a function m deﬁned from 2H to [0,1] such as
P
A#HmðAÞ ¼ 1.
The quantitym(A), called the belief mass of subset A, represents the partial belief that A is true. Whenm(A)– 0, A is called
focal set. Moreover, a BBA m is said to be:
 Normal if £ is not a focal set, i.e., m(£) = 0. The initial works [7,18] on evidence theory requires that m(£) = 0, but this
condition is not imposed in the transferable belief model [20]. In this paper, we will only consider normal BBAs;
 Bayesian if all its focal sets are singletons;
 Dogmatic if H is not a focal set, i.e., m(H) = 0;
 Vacuous ifH is the only focal set, i.e., ifm(H) = 1 andm(A) = 0 for all A–H. This type of BBA is used to represent the total
ignorance case;
 Simple if m(H) =w and m(A) = 1  w for some A–H and 0 6w 6 1. When w > 1, m is not a BBA since it is no longer a
function from 2H to [0,1]. Such a function can be referred as an inverse simple BBA. Both simple and inverse simple BBAs
are known as generalized simple BBAs and denoted as denoted Aw. w is interpreted as the weight of evidence [21] (these
notions will be used later in the deﬁnition of the normalized cautious rule of combination).
A BBA can equivalently be represented by its associated belief (or credibility) and plausibility functions [18] deﬁned
respectively by the following formulas:BelðAÞ ¼
X
B#A
mðBÞ ð1Þ
PlðAÞ ¼
X
A\B–£
mðBÞ ð2Þ
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belief that can potentially be placed in A, i.e., the belief that support completely and partially A. Of course, Bel(A) 6 Pl(A)
for all A # H. Moreover, these two functions are connected by the equation PlðAÞ ¼ 1 BelðAÞ where A denotes the comple-
ment of A.
Finally, there is a third function that can be deduced from the BBA called the commonality function. Formally, this func-
tion is deﬁned as follows:QðAÞ ¼
X
A#B
mðBÞ ð3Þwhere Q(A) is measure of the belief mass that can move freely to any element of A. This function has no real intuitive sense,
but it is used in evidence theory to optimize computations and to prove and express theorems and properties. In particular,
the notion of weight of evidence introduced above can be expressed using the commonality function using the following
equation:wðAÞ ¼
Y
A#B
QðBÞð1ÞjBjjAjþ1 ð4Þ2.2. Combination
The combination is an operation that constitutes a crucial component of evidence theory. Given several BBAs induced by
several sources, it is usually required to aggregate them in order to yield a global BBA synthesizing the knowledge of the
different sources. Within this context, several combinations rules have been proposed in evidence theory to aggregate inde-
pendent and dependant sources. Among others, we can mention Dempster’s rule [7,18], Dubois and Prade’s rule [11], Yager’s
rule [27], the cautious rule (normalized and unnormalized) [8], etc. In this section, we will only describe Dempster’s and the
normalized cautious rules.
Dempster’s rule, also known as the normalized conjunctive rule [19], has been the ﬁrst combination operator proposed in
evidence theory. This rule allows the combination of BBAs provided by independent sources, i.e., distinct BBAs. Letm1 andm2
be two distinct BBAs to combine, Dempster’s rule is deﬁned for all A # H as follows:mðAÞ ¼ ð1 kÞ1 
X
B\C¼A
m1ðBÞ m2ðCÞ ð5Þwhere k ¼PB\C¼£m1ðBÞ m2ðCÞ, i.e., the belief mass that the combination assigns to the empty set. The coefﬁcient k reﬂects
the conﬂict between the sources whereas the quotient (1  k)1 is a normalization term guarantying that no belief is asso-
ciated to empty set and that the total belief is equal to one.
Dempster’s rule has several interesting mathematical properties. It can be proved to be both commutative and associa-
tive. Therefore, the combination result of several BBAs is independent of the order in which they are considered. This rule has
been used in several applications for instance in the expert systems [1]. However, the main drawback of this operator is that
it cannot be applied to combine BBAs given by dependant sources, i.e., nondistinct BBAs. To perform the combination in such
situations, Denoeux has proposed the normalized cautious rule [8]. This operator, which combines nondogmatic BBAs, is
based on the notion of weight of evidence described previously. In practice, the combination of two nondogmatic BBAs
m1 and m2 using the normalized cautious rule is determined as follows:
 Compute the commonality functions Q1 and Q2 using Eq. (3).
 Compute the weights of evidence w1 and w2 that are obtained from the commonalities using Eq. (4).
 Determine the generalized simple BBAs Aminðw1ðAÞ;w2ðAÞÞ for all A H such that min(w1(A),w2(A))– 1.
 Combine the induced generalized simple BBAs using Dempster’s rule.
The normalized cautious rule is also commutative and associative and it has been also used to combine expert opinions.
The interested reader can refer to [12] that gives an application of this rule to climate sensitivity assessment.3. RBBD concept
In this section, we will propose a new concept called RBBD in the context of multicriteria decision problems which allows
ranking evaluations expressed by BBAs. The underlying idea of this approach has been inspired from a multicriteria ranking
method called TOPSIS [13] which is based on the comparison of the actions to two referential solutions called ideal and nadir
actions using Euclidean distances. In our approach, the BBAs are compared to ideal or nadir BBAs using distances called belief
distances. Therefore, after presenting formally the problem, we will introduce the notion of belief distances. Then, we will
deﬁne the ideal and nadir BBAs and we will describe how a partial or a total preorder of the BBAs can be obtained. Finally,
we will discuss the properties of our technique.
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Before describing formally the problem, let us note that a part of the theoretical material presented in this paper has been
already used in [4] including the notation described below. Other concepts will be deﬁned after when introducing the belief
distances and our model inspired by Xu et al.’s method.
We consider a ranking problem which can be represented by three elements: the actions, the ordinal criteria and the
assessment grades sets related to the criteria. At ﬁrst, we will consider situations where only one expert evaluates the alter-
natives. In what follows, let:
 A = {a1,a2, . . . ,an} be the set of actions;
 G = {g1,g2, . . . ,gq} be the set of ordinal criteria;
 Xh ¼ fxh1; xh2; . . . ; xhrhg be the assessment grades set of criterion gh.
The n alternatives are evaluated, on each criterion gh, using the rh assessment grades xhj (with j = 1,2, . . . ,rh) which are re-
quired to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive. These grades constitute the frame of discernment in evidence theory and are
deﬁned such as xh1  xh2      xhrh , i.e., xh1 is less preferred than xh2 and so on.
The evaluation of each action ai with respect to each criterion gh is given by a normal BBA mhi deﬁned on the set X
h. Since
xh1  xh2      xhrh , the focal sets of any BBA deﬁned on X
h should be either singletons or disjunctions of successive elements
of Xh. In what follows, we will denote S(Xh) the set of singletons and all the subsets constituted of successive elements of Xh.
Therefore, mhi is deﬁned formally as a function from S(X
h) to [0,1] such as mhi ð£Þ ¼ 0 and
P
C#Xhm
h
i ðCÞ ¼ 1. Of course, when
the expert is unable to express the assessment of an action ai on a given criterion gh, this is modeled using a vacuous BBA. In
such case, the total belief mass is assigned to the frame Xh.
Finally, it is interesting to deﬁne the sets Ahk and B
h
l before describing the RBBD concept. For all h 2 {1,2, . . . ,q} and for all
k 2 {0,1, . . . ,rh}, let:Ahk ¼
£ if k ¼ 0
fxh1; . . . ; xhkg otherwise

ð6Þand let S
!
ðXhÞ denote the set fAh1;Ah2; . . . ;Ahrhg. Similarly, for all h 2 {1,2, . . . ,q} and for all l 2 {0,1, . . . ,rh} such as l = rh  k, let:Bhl ¼
£ if l ¼ 0
fxhrhlþ1; . . . ; xhrhg otherwise
(
ð7Þand let S
 
ðXhÞ denote the set fBh1;Bh2; . . . ;Bhrhg  k and l represent respectively the number of elements of the sets A
h
k and B
h
l .
Obviously, j S
!
ðXhÞj ¼ j S
 
ðXhÞj ¼ rh; Ahk ¼ Bhrhk ¼ B
h
l for all k 2 {0,1, . . . ,rh} and Bhl ¼ Ahrhl ¼ A
h
k for all l 2 {0,1, . . . ,rh}.
3.2. Belief distances
The term ‘‘distance’’ is not a new concept in evidence theory. Indeed, several distances that quantify the dissimilarity
between BBAs have been deﬁned. For instance, one can cite Tessem’s distance [22], Jousselme et al.’s distance [15], Ristic
and Smets’ distance [16], etc. However, these distances do not seem to be well suited to measure the divergence between
BBAs deﬁned on a frame with ordered elements. For instance, let us consider three BBAs mh1; m
h
2 and m
h
3 that represent
respectively the evaluations of three actions a1, a2 and a3 on a given criterion gh. Let X
h ¼ fxh1; xh2; xh3g be the set of assess-
ment grades of gh deﬁned such as xh1  xh2  xh3 and let us suppose that mh1ðfxh1gÞ ¼ 1; mh2ðfxh2gÞ ¼ 1 and mh3ðfxh3gÞ ¼ 1.
Using one of the distances cited previously leads to the following result: the distance between mh1 and m
h
2 ðdðmh1;mh2ÞÞ
is equal to the distance between mh1 and m
h
3 ðdðmh1;mh3ÞÞ. This result is understandably incoherent because dðmh1;mh2Þ
should be inferior to dðmh1;mh3Þ since xh1 is closer to xh2 than to xh3 in terms of preference. To avoid this type of counter-
intuitive results, we will propose distance measures called ‘‘belief distances’’ that take into account the preference infor-
mation on the elements of the frame. Before presenting these distances, let us deﬁne the notions of ascending and
descending belief functions [4,6] which have been already used to deﬁne the ﬁrst belief dominance approach (see for-
mula 18).
Deﬁnition 1. The ascending belief function, denoted Belhi
!
and induced by mhi , is a function Bel
h
i
!
: S
!
ðXhÞ ! ½0;1 deﬁned such
as Belhi
!
ðAhkÞ ¼
P
C#Ahk
mhi ðCÞ for all Ahk 2 S
!
ðXhÞ.
Deﬁnition 2. The descending belief function, denoted Belhi
 
and induced bymhi , is a function Bel
h
i
 
: S
 
ðXhÞ ! ½0;1 deﬁned such
as Belhi
 
ðBhl Þ ¼
P
C#Bhl
mhi ðCÞ for all Bhl 2 S
 
ðXhÞ.
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beliefs of the nested sets Ah1;A
h
2; . . . ;A
h
rh
, i.e., the sets fxh1g; fxh1; xh2g; . . . ; fxh1; . . . ; xhrhg whereas the latter represents the beliefs of
the nested sets Bh1;B
h
2; . . . ; B
h
rh
, i.e., the sets fxhrhg; fxhrh1; xhrhg; . . . ; fxh1; . . . ; xhrhg. Of course, since xh1 and xhrh are respectively the
worst and the best assessment grades of Xh, the more the values of Belhi
!
for all Ahk 2 S
!
ðXhÞ decrease and those of Belhi
 
for
all Bhl 2 S
 
ðXhÞ increase, the better is the BBA.
Basically, the intuition behind the proposed belief distances is that two BBAs will be as close as their ascending belief
functions and their descending belief functions are alike. Therefore, in order to quantify the dissimilarity between two BBAs,
we should deﬁne a distance measure between their ascending belief functions and another one between their descending
belief functions. We will call these distances respectively ascending and descending belief distances.
Deﬁnition 3. Let Belhi
!
and Belhi0
!
be two ascending belief functions related respectively to two BBAs mhi and m
h
i0 , the ascending
belief distance is deﬁned as follows:d Belhi
!
;Belhi0
! !
¼
Xrh
k¼1
Belhi
!
ðAhkÞ  Belhi0
!
ðAhkÞ

 ð8ÞDeﬁnition 4. Let Belhi
 
and Belhi0
 
be two descending belief functions related respectively to two BBAs mhi and m
h
i0 , the descend-
ing belief distance is deﬁned as follows:d Belhi
 
;Belhi0
  !
¼
Xrh
l¼1
Belhi
 
ðBhl Þ  Belhi0
 
ðBhl Þ

 ð9ÞOf course, the ascending belief distance is a metric, i.e., it satisﬁes the following axioms:
 The non-negativity: d Belhi
!
;Belhi0
! !
P 0.
 The symmetry: d Belhi
!
;Belhi0
! !
¼ d Belhi0
!
;Belhi
! !
.
 The non-degeneracy: d Belhi
!
;Belhi0
! !
¼ 0() Belhi
!
¼ Belhi0
!
.
 The triangle inequality: d Belhi
!
;Belhi0
! !
6 d Belhi
!
;Belhi00
! !
þ d Belhi00
!
;Belhi0
! !
.
Similarly, the descending belief distance veriﬁes the above axioms and therefore it is a metric. The proofs are trivial and
obvious. Thus, we will not give them in this paper.
3.3. Ideal and nadir BBAs
As mentioned above, the fundamental idea of the RBBD concept is that the BBAs representing the evaluations of the ac-
tions on each criterion are compared to ideal or nadir BBAs. In what follows, we will deﬁne these two particular BBAs.
The ideal BBA is the best BBA among all the BBAs that can be deﬁned on the set S(Xh) whereas the nadir BBA is the worst
one among these BBAs. They represent respectively the best and the worst evaluations that can be reached on a criterion gh.
Since xh1 and x
h
rh
are respectively the worst and the best assessment grades related to gh, therefore the ideal and nadir BBAs
can be deﬁned respectively as follows:
Deﬁnition 5. The ideal BBA on a criterion gh is a function mhideal from S(X
h) to [0,1] such as mhidealðfxhrhgÞ ¼ 1.Deﬁnition 6. The nadir BBA on a criterion gh is a function mhnadir from S(X
h) to [0,1] such as mhnadirðfxh1gÞ ¼ 1.
The comparison of the BBAs to the ideal and nadir BBAs is based on the notion of belief distances deﬁned above. The dis-
similarity of a given BBA mhi to the ideal BBA m
h
ideal is measured through the two ascending and descending belief distances
d Belhi
!
;Belhideal
! !
and d Belhi
 
;Belhideal
  !
. Since mhideal is a particular type of BBA, these belief distances can respectively be ex-
pressed as follows:d Belhi
!
;Belhideal
! !
¼
Xrh
k¼1
Belhi
!
ðAhkÞ
 !
 1 ð10Þ
d Belhi
 
;Belhideal
  !
¼ rh 
Xrh
l¼1
Belhi
 
ðBhl Þ ð11Þ
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h
nadir is performed using the two ascending and descending belief
distances d Belhi
!
;Belhnadir
! !
and d Belhi
 
;Belhnadir
  !
. Since mhnadir is a particular case of BBA, these belief distances can respectively
be written as:d Belhi
!
;Belhnadir
! !
¼ rh 
Xrh
k¼1
Belhi
!
ðAhkÞ ð12Þ
d Belhi
 
;Belhnadir
  !
¼
Xrh
l¼1
Belhi
 
ðBhl Þ
 !
 1 ð13ÞThe proofs of formulas 10, 11, 12 and 13 are given in Appendix A (see proofs 1, 2, 3 and 4, resp.).
3.4. Partial and total preorders of the BBAs
Based on the belief distances between the BBAs and the ideal BBA on each criterion gh, it is possible to obtain two rankings
of the BBAs representing the evaluations of the actions on gh. The ﬁrst one is associated to the ascending belief distances
d Belhi
!
;Belhideal
! !
whereas the second one is related to the descending belief distances d Belhi
 
;Belhideal
  !
. Of course, the lower
the values of these belief distances, the better mhi . Similarly, the comparison of the BBAs to the nadir BBA allows obtaining
two rankings related respectively to the ascending and descending belief distances d Belhi
!
;Belhnadir
! !
and d Belhi
 
;Belhnadir
  !
: the
higher their values, the better mhi .
From formulas 10 to 13, it is easy to see that the ascending belief distances to the ideal and nadir BBAs are linearly linked
(idem for the descending belief distances to the ideal and nadir BBAs). Since the belief distances to the ideal BBA are to min-
imize and those to the nadir BBA are to be maximize, one can deduce that the rankings related to d Belhi
!
;Belhideal
! !
and
d Belhi
!
;Belhnadir
! !
are the same (idem for the rankings related to d Belhi
 
;Belhideal
  !
and d Belhi
 
;Belhnadir
  !
Þ. Therefore, the compar-
ison to the ideal and nadir BBAs can be reduced to a comparison to one of them.
When comparing the BBAs to the ideal BBA, it is possible to deduce a partial preorder of these BBAs called the RBBD I
ranking. This preorder is obtained as the intersection of the two rankings related to d Belhi
!
;Belhideal
! !
and d Belhi
 
;Belhideal
  !
.
Three preference situations can be distinguished in this context between the BBAs on gh: the preference (Ph) (P
1
h for the in-
verse), the indifference (Ih) and the incomparability (Jh). The latter appears between two BBAs when it is impossible to ex-
press indifference or preference between them. Formally, these relations can be expressed as follows:mhi Phm
h
i0 ()
d Belhi
!
;Belhideal
! !
6 d Belhi0
!
;Belhideal
! !
and d Belhi
 
;Belhideal
  !
< d Belhi0
 
;Belhideal
  !
d Belhi
!
;Belhideal
! !
< d Belhi0
!
;Belhideal
! !
and d Belhi
 
;Belhideal
  !
6 d Belhi0
 
;Belhideal
  !
8>>><
>>>>:
mhi Ihm
h
i0 () d Bel
h
i
!
;Belhideal
! !
¼ d Belhi0
!
;Belhideal
! !
and d Belhi
 
;Belhideal
  !
¼ d Belhi0
 
;Belhideal
  !
mhi Jhm
h
i0 ()
d Belhi
!
;Belhideal
! !
< d Belhi0
!
;Belhideal
! !
and d Belhi
 
;Belhideal
  !
> d Belhi0
 
;Belhideal
  !
d Belhi
!
;Belhideal
! !
> d Belhi0
!
;Belhideal
! !
and d Belhi
 
;Belhideal
  !
< d Belhi0
 
;Belhideal
  !
8>>><
>>>>:
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
ð14ÞUsing the belief distances to the nadir BBA, the RBBD I ranking can be obtained as the intersection of the two rankings related
to d Belhi
!
;Belhnadir
! !
and d Belhi
 
;Belhnadir
  !
. In this case, the relations Ph, Ih and Jh can be deduced as follows:
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h
i0 ()
d Belhi
!
;Belhnadir
! !
P d Belhi0
!
;Belhnadir
! !
and d Belhi
 
;Belhnadir
  !
> d Belhi0
 
;Belhnadir
  !
d Belhi
!
;Belhnadir
! !
> d Belhi0
!
;Belhnadir
! !
and d Belhi
 
;Belhnadir
  !
P d Belhi0
 
;Belhnadir
  !
8>>><
>>>:
mhi Ihm
h
i0 () d Bel
h
i
!
;Belhnadir
! !
¼ d Belhi0
!
;Belhnadir
! !
and d Belhi
 
;Belhnadir
  !
¼ d Belhi0
 
;Belhnadir
  !
mhi Jhm
h
i0 ()
d Belhi
!
;Belhnadir
! !
> d Belhi0
!
;Belhnadir
! !
and d Belhi
 
;Belhnadir
  !
< d Belhi0
 
;Belhnadir
  !
d Belhi
!
;Belhnadir
! !
< d Belhi0
!
;Belhnadir
! !
and d Belhi
 
;Belhnadir
  !
> d Belhi0
 
;Belhnadir
  !
8>>><
>>>:
8>>>>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
ð15ÞIn addition to the partial preorder, it is possible to obtain a total preorder of the BBAs on each criterion gh, i.e., a complete
ranking without incomparabilities. This preorder, called the RBBD II ranking, can be deduced based on the belief distances to
the ideal BBA or to the nadir BBA. When the BBAs are compared to the ideal BBA, the total preorder is established based on a
global score ahi computed for each BBA mhi as follows:ahi ¼ d Belhi
!
;Belhideal
! !
þ d Belhi
 
; Belhideal
  !
ð16ÞOf course, the lower ahi , the better mhi . Using the belief distances to the nadir BBA, the RBBD II ranking is deduced using a
global score bhi deﬁned for each BBA m
h
i as follows:bhi ¼ d Belhi
!
;Belhnadir
! !
þ d Belhi
 
; Belhnadir
  !
ð17ÞObviously, the higher bhi , the better m
h
i . Moreover, it is easy to deduce from formulas 10 to 13 that ahi ¼ bhi  2þ 2:rh.
Therefore, ahi and b
h
i are linearly linked.
3.5. Properties
The RBBD concept veriﬁes two important properties: the dominance and the stability of the preferences. The ﬁrst prop-
erty is a natural condition that our procedure should satisfy. Within evidence theory, the dominance or the non-dominance
of a BBA to another is determined using the ﬁrst belief dominance concept (FBD) (let us note that similar approaches to this
concept called credal orderings have been proposed by Thierry Denoeux [9]). This approach, which is a generalization of the
ﬁrst stochastic dominance, is deﬁned as follows:mhi FBDm
h
i0 ()
Belhi
!
ðAhkÞ 6 Belhi0
!
ðAhkÞ for all Ahk 2 S
!
ðXhÞ
Belhi
 
ðBhl ÞP Belhi0
 
ðBhl Þ for all Bhl 2 S
!
ðXhÞ
8><
>: ð18ÞThe ﬁrst belief dominance allows performing pairwise comparisons between the BBAs. Two situations can be identiﬁed
when using this concept:
 FBD when mhi dominates mhi0 , i.e., if mhi FBDmhi0 .
 FBD when mhi does not dominate mhi0 , i.e., mhi FBDmhi0 .
Of course, when mhi FBDm
h
i0 and m
h
i0FBDm
h
i ; m
h
i and m
h
i0 are incomparable according to this concept. Moreover, let us note
that this approach has been used recently in a multicriteria choice model inspired by ELECTRE I to compare evaluations ex-
pressed by BBAs [4].
Proposition 1. If mhi FBDm
h
i0 , then m
h
i Phm
h
i0 or m
h
i Ihm
h
i0 .
This proposition means that if a BBA mhi dominates a BBA m
h
i0 according to the ﬁrst belief dominance, the rank of m
h
i may
not be worse than the rank of mhi0 using the RBBD concept. In other words, m
h
i should be preferred or indifferent to m
h
i0 . The
proof is detailed in Appendix A (proof 5).
The second characteristic of the RBBD concept is the stability of the preferences. This property means that the ranks of
two BBAs mhi and m
h
i0 may not be reversed when a third BBA is removed or added to the initial set of BBAs. Our approach
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referential BBA (ideal or nadir), i.e., the rank of a BBA does not depend of the remaining BBAs that need to be ranked.
Before ending this section, it isworthmentioning that it is possible to use theﬁrst belief dominance concept toobtain a rank-
ingof theBBAs. For that purpose,we apply at ﬁrst this approach inorder to compare all thepairs of theBBAs. These comparisons
are then represented by a graph that synthesises all the relations (FBD or FBDÞ holding between the BBAs. Finally, based on this
graph, the ranking of the BBAs is deduced. However, themain drawback of using the ﬁrst belief dominance to rank the BBAs is
the number of incomparabilities between the BBAs that can be important is some situations (this problem is well known in the
multicriteria analysis). This number is always superior or equal to the one obtained by the RBBD concept (RBBD I ranking). This
result is a direct consequence of Proposition 1. The proof is given in Appendix A (proof 6). The following example illustrates a
case where the ﬁrst belief dominance and the RBBD concepts are used to rank a set of BBAs.
Example 1. Let us consider a multicriteria problem where ﬁve actions are evaluated on a set of ordinal criteria and where
the evaluations are expressed by BBAs. In this example, we will only consider the evaluations on criterion g1 given in Table 1.
Let x11; x
1
2 and x
1
3 be the assessment grades of g1 deﬁned such as x
1
1  x12  x13.
The ﬁrst belief dominance is applied to rank these BBAs. Therefore, we compute at ﬁrst the ascending and descending
belief functions of each BBA and we determine the observed belief dominances according to this concept for each pair of
alternatives. The results are illustrated in Table 2. Then, we build the graph synthesizing all the relations between the BBAs
representing the evaluations and we deduce the ranking of these BBAs. Fig. 1 gives this preorder. As can be noticed, the eval-Table 1
BBAs characterizing the actions performances on criterion g1.
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
BBAs m11ðfx11gÞ ¼ 0:4
m11ðfx12gÞ ¼ 0:3
m11ðfx13gÞ ¼ 0:2
m11ðfx11; x12; x13gÞ ¼ 0:1
m12ðfx11gÞ ¼ 0:2
m12ðfx11; x12; x13gÞ ¼ 0:8
m13ðfx11gÞ ¼ 0:2
m13ðfx12gÞ ¼ 0:2
m13ðfx13gÞ ¼ 0:5
m13ðfx11; x12; x13gÞ ¼ 0:1
m14ðfx11gÞ ¼ 0:1
m14ðfx12gÞ ¼ 0:2
m14ðfx13gÞ ¼ 0:3
m14ðfx11; x12; x13gÞ ¼ 0:4
m15ðfx11gÞ ¼ 0:2
m15ðfx11; x12gÞ ¼ 0:2
m15ðfx11; x12; x13gÞ ¼ 0:6
Table 2
Observed belief dominances between the evaluations.
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
a1 – FBD FBD FBD FBD
a2 FBD – FBD FBD FBD
a3 FBD FBD – FBD FBD
a4 FBD FBD FBD – FBD
a5 FBD FBD FBD FBD –
a1
a2
a3
a4
a5
Fig. 1. Ranking of the evaluations obtained by the ﬁrst belief dominance.
Table 3
Ascending and descending belief distances and global scores with regard to the ideal BBA.
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
d Bel1i
!
;Bel1ideal
! ! 1.1 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6
d Bel1i
 
;Bel1ideal
  ! 1.3 2 0.8 1.2 2
a1i 2.4 2.4 1.4 1.6 2.6
a4 a2 a5
a1
a3
Fig. 2. RBBD I ranking of the evaluations.
a4
a2
a3 a5
a1
Fig. 3. RBBD II ranking of the evaluations.
Table 4
Ascending and descending belief distances and global scores with regard to the nadir BBA.
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
d Bel1i
!
;Bel1nadir
! ! 0.9 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.4
d Bel1i
 
;Bel1nadir
  ! 0.7 0 1.2 0.8 0
b1i 1.6 1.6 2.6 2.4 1.4
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a4. Thus, the best evaluations on g1 are those of a1, a2, a3 and a4. Moreover, we can easily identify 7 incomparable pairs of
evaluations which are those of a1 and a2, a1 and a3, a1 and a4, a1 and a5, a2 and a3, a2 and a4 and ﬁnally a3 and a4.
The RBBD concept has been also used to rank the BBAs given in Table 1. For that purpose, we determine at ﬁrst the ideal
BBA. Since x13 is the best assessment grade related to criterion g1, the ideal BBA is therefore: m
1
idealðfx13gÞ ¼ 1. Then, we com-
pute the ascending and descending belief distances of each BBA with regard to the ideal BBA. Table 3 gives the values of these
distances. Finally, we determine the two rankings associated to the ascending and descending belief distances. The intersec-
tion of these two rankings is the RBBD I ranking. Fig. 2 illustrates this partial preorder. As can be remarked, the evaluation of
a4 is preferred to those of a1, a2 and a5 on criterion g1 and the evaluation of a3 is incomparable to the one of a4. Thus, the best
evaluations on g1 are those of a3 and a4. Furthermore, the number of incomparable pairs of evaluations is 4. These pairs are
the following: a1 and a2, a1 and a5, a2 and a3 and ﬁnally a3 and a4. It is clear therefore that the number of incomparable eval-
uations obtained by the RBBD concept is inferior to the one obtained by the ﬁrst belief dominance approach.
Let us suppose now that a total preorder of the evaluations should be determined. Thus, we can use the RBBD II ranking.
For that purpose, we compute the global scores of the BBAs which are given in Table 3 (last line). Then, we determine the
total preorder as shown in Fig. 3. As can be seen, the evaluations of actions a1 and a2 are indifferent. The best and the worst
evaluations are respectively those of a3 and a5.
Finally, let us note that it is possible to determine the RBBD I and II rankings based on the comparisons of the BBAs to the
nadir BBA. Of course, since x11 is the worst assessment grade on g1, the nadir BBA is nothing else thanm
1
nadirðfx11gÞ ¼ 1. Table 4
gives the ascending and descending belief distances of the BBAs with regard the nadir BBA as well as the global scores.4. The model
In this section, we will propose a model inspired by a multicriteria procedure called Xu et al.’s method [26] to rank alter-
natives in uncertain, imprecise and multi-experts contexts. At ﬁrst, we will describe brieﬂy Xu et al.’s procedure. Then, we
will present the steps of our model.4.1. Xu et al.’s method
Xu et al.’s method is a ranking approach which uses partial or total preorders of the evaluations of the actions on each
criterion. These single-criterion preorders reﬂect situations of preference ðPhÞ ðP1h for the inverse), indifference (Ih) and
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between two actions ai and ai0 on gh.
Basically, the underlying idea of this method is that an action ai performs better if more relations aiPhai0 and fewer rela-
tions aiP
1
h ai0 hold for i
0 – i. In order to determine the performance of ai, Xu et al. have incorporated in their approach the
notion of distance between the preference relations. Brieﬂy, this concept allows quantifying the degree of divergence be-
tween each pair of preference relations. The numerical values of this distance have been determined on the basis of several
conditions suggested in [14]. For instance, Ph and P
1
h are considered as the most discordant relations and Jh is viewed as equi-
distant from Ih, Ph and P
1
h . Table 5 gives the distance values between each pair of preference relations. Let us note that Xu
et al.’s method considers only the distances with regard to Ph and P
1
h , i.e., the distances between Ph and each Rhðai; ai0 Þ de-
noted DðPh;Rhðai; ai0 ÞÞ and the distances between P1h and each Rhðai; ai0 Þ denoted DðP1h ;Rhðai; ai0 ÞÞ. Of course, the less
DðPh;Rhðai; ai0 ÞÞ and the more DðP1h ;Rhðai; ai0 ÞÞ, the better ai.
The distances DðPh;Rhðai; ai0 ÞÞ and DðP1h ;Rhðai; ai0 ÞÞ allow respectively building two total preorders O1 and O2 which are
then combined to determine the global ranking of the actions denoted O. The total preorder O1 is built iteratively as follows.
In the ﬁrst step, a distance that describes the dominating character of ai on each criterion gh is computed. This distance, de-
noted dPh ðaiÞ, is determined as the sum of all DðPh;Rhðai; ai0 ÞÞ for all i0 – i:Table 5
Numeri
Ih
Ph
Jh
P1hdPh ðaiÞ ¼
X
i0–i
DðPh;Rhðai; ai0 ÞÞ ð19ÞThen, the distance that represents the dominating character of ai on all the criteria is deduced as follows:dO1 ðaiÞ ¼
Xq
h¼1
wh:d
Ph ðaiÞ ð20Þwhere wh denotes the weight of criterion gh. Of course, the less this distance, the better ai. Based on the values of d
O1 ðaiÞ, we
determine the best action(s), i.e. the action(s) that has (have) the minimum of these values. In the second step, the above
distances are recomputed but only for the actions that are not yet ranked. These distances are determined without taking
into account the action(s) ranked in the ﬁrst step. Then, the best alternative(s) is (are) determined as previously. This pro-
cedure continues as describe above until all the actions are ranked. Let us note that two actions are indifferent in O1if their
related distances are equal and represent the minimal values of the distances computed on a given iteration.
In the same way, the total preorder O2 is built iteratively, but instead of considering the dominating character of ai, we
consider its dominated intensity. For that purpose, we determine the distance dP
1
h ðaiÞ that describes this character on each
criterion gh. Formally:dP
1
h ðaiÞ ¼
X
i0–i
DðP1h ;Rhðai; ai0 ÞÞ ð21ÞThen, we compute the distance that represents the dominated character of ai on all the criteria using the following formula:dO2 ðaiÞ ¼
Xq
h¼1
wh:d
P1h ðaiÞ ð22ÞOf course, the best alternative(s) is (are) the one (those) that has (have) the maximum of the values of dO2 ðaiÞ. Moreover, two
actions are indifferent in O2 if their related distances are equal and represent the maximal values of the distances on a given
iteration.
Finally, the global preorder O is determined as the intersection of O1 and O2. In this context, three preference situations
can be deduced between the actions: the preference (P) (P1 for the inverse), the indifference (I) and the incomparability (J).
The intersection is carried using the following principles:
 aiPai0 in O if aiPai0 in both O1 and O2, or if aiPai0 in one preorder and aiIai0 in the other;
 aiIai0 in O if aiIai0 in both O1 and O2;
 aiJai0 in O if aiPai0 in one preorder and aiP1ai0 in the other.cal values of the distances between the preference relations.
Ih Ph Jh P1h
D(Ih, Ih) = 0 D(Ih,Ph) = 1 D(Ih, Jh) = 4/3 DðIh; P1h Þ ¼ 1
D(Ph, Ih) = 1 D(Ph,Ph) = 0 D(Ph, Jh) = 4/3 DðPh; P1h Þ ¼ 5=3
D(Jh, Ih) = 4/3 D(Jh,Ph) = 4/3 D(Jh, Jh) = 0 DðJh ; P1h Þ ¼ 4=3
DðP1h ; IhÞ ¼ 1 DðP1h ; PhÞ ¼ 5=3 DðP1h ; JhÞ ¼ 4=3 DðP1h ; P1h Þ ¼ 0
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In what follows, we will describe our model inspired by Xu et al.’s method. At ﬁrst, we assume that the experts are non-
equivalent in their importance within the group. We further assume that several experts express their assessments for a set
of actions with respect to a set of criteria. This information is provided on the form of BBAs. Additionally, we assume that
each expert gives his own values to the criteria weights. In what follows, let:
 wf be the importance of expert Ef within the group (with f = 1,2, . . . ,s).
 whjf be the weight of criterion gh given by expert Ef.
 mhijf be the BBA that represents the evaluation of action ai according to criterion gh and given by expert Ef.
The steps of the proposed model are the following. At ﬁrst, the RBBD concept is applied by each expert to rank his indi-
vidual BBAs on each criterion. Based on the obtained single-criterion preorders of the evaluations, each expert determines
his individual global ranking of the actions as in Xu et al.’s method. The same procedure used in this method to obtain
the individual global rankings is then applied to aggregate them in order to obtain the collective global ranking of the actions.
4.2.1. Ranking the individual BBAs
In the ﬁrst step of the model, the individual BBAs given by each expert and characterizing the actions performances on
each criterion are ranked using the RBBD concept. Two single-criterion preorders of the evaluations can be deduced: the
RBBD I and II rankings. As mentioned before, the former gives a partial preorder of the evaluations on each criterion accord-
ing to each expert and allows taking into account situations of incomparability. The latter gives a total preorder of the eval-
uations on each criterion according to each expert, i.e., a ranking from the best to the worst or vice versa.
4.2.2. Determining the individual global rankings
Once the single-criterion preorders of the evaluations are determined by each expert, we aggregate them in order to
determine the individual global ranking of the actions. The aggregation is performed as in Xu et al.’s method. For that pur-
pose, each expert determines at ﬁrst the two individual total preorders Of1 and O
f
2. Let R
f
hðai; ai0 Þ 2 fPh; P1h ; Ih; Jhg be the pref-
erence relation between ai and ai0 observed on the single-criterion preorder of gh given by expert Ef. The preorder O
f
1 is built
iteratively using the distance that quantiﬁes the individual dominating character of ai on all the criteria deﬁned as follows:dO
f
1 ðaiÞ ¼
Xq
h¼1
whjf :d
Ph
f ðaiÞ ð23Þwhere dPhf ðaiÞ ¼
P
i0–iDðPh;Rfhðai; ai0 ÞÞ is a distance that describes the individual dominating character of ai on criterion gh. In
the same way, the preorder Of2 is established iteratively on the basis of the distance representing the individual dominated
character of ai on all the criteria and given by the following formula:dO
f
2 ðaiÞ ¼
Xq
h¼1
whjf :d
P1h
f ðaiÞ ð24Þwhere dP
1
h
f ðaiÞ ¼
P
i0–iDðP1h ;Rfhðai; ai0 ÞÞ is a distance that describes the individual dominated character of ai on gh. Then, the
two total preorders Of1 and O
f
2 are combined in order to obtain the individual global ranking of the actions O
f.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that, at this step, each expert has the possibility to choose between the two single-criterion
preorders of the evaluations (i.e., the RBBD I or II rankings) before applying the aggregation procedure of Xu et al.’s method.
The choice between them can be also imposed by the decision maker. Of course, using the RBBD II rankings can lead to a loss
of useful information about incomparabilities. That is why it is preferable to use the RBBD I rankings, i.e., the single-criterion
partial preorders of the evaluations.
4.2.3. Determining the collective global ranking
In this step, the individual global rankings are aggregated in order to obtain the collective global ranking of the actions.
For that purpose, we propose to use the same procedure used in Xu et al.’s method in the aggregation of the single-criterion
preorders. We should, therefore, determine at ﬁrst the two collective total preorders O1 and O2. In what follows, let
Rf ðai; ai0 Þ 2 fP; P1; I; Jg be the preference relation between ai and ai0 observed on the individual global ranking Of.
The collective total preorder O1 is built iteratively using a distance that quantiﬁes the collective dominating character of ai
according to all experts. More formally:dO1 ðaiÞ ¼
Xs
f¼1
wf :d
P
f ðaiÞ ð25Þwhere dPf ðaiÞ ¼
P
i0–iDðP;Rf ðai; ai0 ÞÞ is a distance that quantiﬁes the individual dominating character of ai according to expert
Ef. The distance d
O1 ðaiÞ is computed at each iteration for the actions not yet ranked and without considering the actions that
are ranked in the previous steps. Similarly, the collective total preorder O2 is built iteratively, but instead of considering the
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following distance:Table 6
Counte
The
The
ThedO2 ðaiÞ ¼
Xs
f¼1
wf :d
P1
f ðaiÞ ð26Þwhere dP
1
f ðaiÞ ¼
P
i0–iDðP1;Rf ðai; ai0 ÞÞ is a distance that quantiﬁes the individual dominated character of ai according to ex-
pert Ef. Finally, the collective global preorder O is determined as the intersection of O1 and O2 using the principles given at the
end of Section 4.1.
Before ending this section, let us note that another manner for the aggregation of the different opinions of the experts is
the use of a combination rule offered by evidence theory to aggregate the individual BBAs given by the experts. Letmhi be the
BBA resulting from the combination of mhij1;m
h
ij2; . . . and m
h
ijs. Obviously, m
h
i represents the collective evaluation of action ai
according to criterion gh.
The combination rule used for the aggregation of the individual BBAs should be commutative and associative. Therefore:
 If the BBAs are distinct, we suggest Dempster’s rule of combination to take into account independencies between experts;
 If the BBAs are nondistinct, we suggest the normalized cautious rule of combination to take into account dependencies
between experts.
Once the collective BBAs are determined, the RBBD concept is used to rank these BBAs. Two collective single-criterion
preorders of the evaluations can be deduced: the RBBD I and II rankings. These preorders (RBBD I or II) are then aggregated
as in Xu et al.’s method in order to obtain the collective global ranking of the actions. However, both combination rules that
we have suggested do not respect in some situations the unanimity property which is a natural condition of an aggregation
operator. Formally, this property means that for all h 2 {1,2, . . . ,q}:
 If mhijf Phmhi0 jf for all f 2 {1,2, . . . ,s}, then mhi Phmhi0 .
 If mhijf P1h mhi0 jf for all f 2 {1,2, . . . ,s}, then mhi P1h mhi0 .
 If mhijf Ihmhi0 jf for all f 2 {1,2, . . . ,s}, then mhi Ihmhi0 .
 If mhijf Jhmhi0 jf for all f 2 {1,2, . . . ,s}, then mhi Jhmhi0 .
That is why we have adopted the procedure used in Xu et al.’s method for the aggregation.
Two counter-examples to the unanimity property are introduced below (see Examples 2 and 3). In the ﬁrst one, we have
used Dempster’s rule to combine distinct BBAs. In the second one, we have used the normalized cautious rule to aggregate
nondistinct BBAs.
Example 2. Let us consider a multicriteria problem where two actions are evaluated by two experts and where the
evaluations are expressed by BBAs. In this example, we will consider only the evaluations on criterion g1. We will assume
that the assessment grades related to g1 are x11; x
1
2; x
1
3 and x
1
4 deﬁned such as x
1
1  x12  x13  x14. Furthermore, we will suppose
that each expert gives the evaluations without interacting with the other. Therefore, the experts are independent and their
induced BBAs are distinct.Dempster’s rule of combination is used in this example to aggregate the BBAs induced by the experts for each action on
criterion g1. The objective is to yield a combined BBA that represents a collective evaluation of each action on criterion g1.
Then, the RBBD concept is applied to rank the BBAs given by each expert and to rank the combined BBAs. Table 6 gives these
BBAs and their RBBD I and II rankings. These preorders have been obtained on the basis of the ascending and descendingr-example to the unanimity property: case of distinct BBAs.
a1 a2 RBBD I ranking RBBD II ranking
BBAs given by expert 1 m11j1ðfx12; x13gÞ ¼ 0:5
m11j1ðfx14gÞ ¼ 0:5
m12j1ðfx12gÞ ¼ 0:33
m12j1ðfx13gÞ ¼ 0:67
m11j1P1m
1
2j1 m
1
1j1P1m
1
2j1
BBAs given by expert 2 m11j2ðfx12; x13gÞ ¼ 1 m12j2ðfx11; x12gÞ ¼ 0:5
m12j2ðfx12; x13gÞ ¼ 0:5
m11j2P1m
1
2j2 m
1
1j2P1m
1
2j2
combined BBAs given by the two experts m11ðfx12; x13gÞ ¼ 1 m12ðfx12gÞ ¼ 0:5
m12ðfx13gÞ ¼ 0:5
m11J1m
1
2 m
1
1I1m
1
2
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ing and the global scores used to obtain the RBBD II ranking. For instance, the ranking of the combined BBAs is determined as
follows:
 d Bel11
!
;Bel1ideal
! 
< d Bel12
!
;Bel1ideal
! 
and d Bel11
 
;Bel1ideal
  
> d Bel12
 
; Bel1ideal
  
, thus m11 and m
1
2 are incomparable according to
the RBBD I ranking;
 a11 ¼ a12, thus m11 and m12 are indifferent according to the RBBD II ranking.
As can be noticed, the experts agree that the evaluation of a1 is preferred to the one of a2 on criterion g1 according to the
RBBD I and II rankings. However, when we apply the RBBD concept to rank the combined BBAs, we obtain: the evaluations of
a1 and a2 are incomparable on g1 according to the RBBD I ranking whereas they are indifferent on g1 according to the RBBD II
ranking. Therefore, Dempster’s rule does not respect the unanimity property.
Example 3. Let us consider a multicriteria problem where two actions are evaluated by two experts and where the
evaluations are expressed by BBAs. In this example, we will consider only the evaluations on criterion g1. We will assume
that the assessment grades related to g1 are x11 and x
1
2 deﬁned such as x
1
1  x12. Moreover, we will assume that the experts
interact between them when they give the evaluations. Thus, the experts are dependent and their induced BBAs are
nondistinct.
The normalized cautious rule of combination is used in this example to aggregate the BBAs induced by the experts for
each action on criterion g1. The objective is to yield a combined BBA that represents a collective evaluation of each action
on criterion g1. Then, the RBBD concept is applied to rank the BBAs given by each expert and to rank the combined BBAs.
Table 8 gives these BBAs and their RBBD I and II rankings. Table 9 illustrates the details about the way we have obtainedTable 7
Ascending and descending belief distances and global scores (case of distinct BBAs).
a1 a2
The BBAs given by expert 1
d Bel1ij1
!
;Bel1idealj1
! ! 0.5 1.33
d Bel1ij1
 
;Bel1idealj1
  ! 1 1.33
a1ij1 1.5 2.66
The BBAs given by expert 2
d Bel1ij2
!
;Bel1idealj2
! ! 1 1.5
d Bel1ij2
 
;Bel1idealj2
  ! 2 2.5
a1ij2 3 4
The combined BBAs given by the two experts
d Bel1i
!
;Bel1ideal
! ! 1 1.5
d Bel1i
 
;Bel1ideal
  ! 2 1.5
a1i 3 3
Table 8
Counter-example to the unanimity property: case of nondistinct BBAs.
a1 a2 RBBD I ranking RBBD II ranking
The BBAs given by expert 1 m11j1ðfx11gÞ ¼ 0:4
m11j1ðfx11; x12gÞ ¼ 0:6
m12j1ðfx11gÞ ¼ 0:6
m12j1ðfx12gÞ ¼ 0:2
m12j1ðfx11; x12gÞ ¼ 0:2
m11j1J1m
1
2j1 m
1
1j1I1m
1
2j1
The BBAs given by expert 2 m11j2ðfx11gÞ ¼ 0:5
m11j2ðfx12gÞ ¼ 0:2
m11j2ðfx11; x12gÞ ¼ 0:3
m12j2ðfx11gÞ ¼ 0:3
m12j2ðfx11; x12gÞ ¼ 0:7
m11j2J1m
1
2j2 m
1
1j1I1m
1
2j1
The combined BBAs given by
the two experts
m11ðfx11gÞ ¼ 0:5
m11ðfx12gÞ ¼ 0:2
m11ðfx11; x12gÞ ¼ 0:3
m12ðfx11gÞ ¼ 0:6
m12ðfx12gÞ ¼ 0:2
m12ðfx11; x12gÞ ¼ 0:2
m11P1m
1
2 m
1
1P1m
1
2
Table 9
Combined BBAs deduced by using the normalized cautious rule.
a1 a2
Q11j1 Q
1
1j2 w
1
1j1 w
1
1j2 w
1
1 Q
1
2j1 Q
1
2j2 w
1
2j1 w
1
2j2 w
1
2
fx11g 1 0.8 0.6 0.375 0.375 0.8 1 0.25 0.7 0.25
fx12g 0.6 0.5 1 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.5 1 0.5
fx11; x12g 0.6 0.3 – – – 0.2 0.7 – – –
The combined BBA m11 is obtained by combining two simple BBAs
fx11g0:375 and fx12g0:6 using the Dempster’s rule. This leads to the
following BBA:
m11ðfx11gÞ ¼ 0:5
m11ðfx12gÞ ¼ 0:2
m11ðfx11; x12gÞ ¼ 0:3
The combined BBA m12 is obtained by combining two simple BBAs
fx11g0:25 and fx12g0:5 using the Dempster’s rule. This leads to the
following BBA:
m12ðfx11gÞ ¼ 0:6
m12ðfx12gÞ ¼ 0:2
m12ðfx11; x12gÞ ¼ 0:2
Table 10
Ascending and descending belief distances and global scores (case of nondistinct BBAs).
a1 a2
The BBAs given by expert 1
d Bel1ij1
!
;Bel1idealj1
! ! 0.4 0.6
d Bel1ij1
 
;Bel1idealj1
  ! 1 0.8
a1ij1 1.4 1.4
The BBAs given by expert 2
d Bel1ij2
!
;Bel1idealj2
! ! 0.5 0.3
d Bel1ij2
 
;Bel1idealj2
  ! 0.8 1
a1ij2 1.3 1.3
The combined BBAs given by the two experts
d Bel1i
!
;Bel1ideal
! ! 0.5 0.6
d Bel1i
 
;Bel1ideal
  ! 0.8 0.8
a1i 1.3 1.4
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the values of the ascending and descending belief distances with regard to the ideal BBA used to deduce the RBBD I ranking
and the global scores used to obtain the RBBD II ranking. For instance, the ranking of the combined BBAs is determined as
follows: d Bel11
!
;Bel1ideal
! 
< d Bel12
!
;Bel1ideal
! 
and d Bel11
 
;Bel1ideal
  
¼ d Bel12
 
;Bel1ideal
  
, thus m11 is preferred to m
1
2 according to the
RBBD I ranking. This result is of course veriﬁed according to the RBBD II ranking since a11 < a12.
As can be noticed, the experts agree that the evaluations of a1 and a2 are incomparable on g1 according to the RBBD I rank-
ing whereas they are indifferent on g1 according to the RBBD II ranking. However, when we apply the RBBD concept to rank
the combined BBAs, we obtain: the evaluation of a1 is preferred to the one of a2 on criterion g1 according to the RBBD I and II
rankings. Thus, the normalized cautious rule does not respect the unanimity property. Finally, let us note that the mean oper-
ator [28] which is also commonly used to aggregate nondistinct sources does not verify this property.5. Illustrative example
In order to illustrate the model, let us consider the following example. A multinational group wants to construct a new
hotel in a city where the group is not yet established. Five sites are considered which are evaluated on the basis of three
ordinal criteria:
 The investment costs (including the land purchasing and the construction costs) (to be minimized).
 The annual operating costs (to be minimized).
 The facility of access to the hotel from the airport (to be maximized).
Table 11
Criteria and assessment grades.
Criterion Assessment grades
g1 ‘‘Investment costs’’ x11 ‘‘Very high’’
x12 ‘‘High’’
x13 ‘‘Average’’
x14 ‘‘Low’’
x15 ‘‘Very low’’
g2 ‘‘Annual operating costs’’ x21 ‘‘Very high’’
x22 ‘‘High’’
x23 ‘‘Average’’
x24 ‘‘Low’’
x25 ‘‘Very low’’
g3 ‘‘Facility of access to the hotel from the airport’’ x31 ‘‘Difﬁcult’’
x32 ‘‘Rather easy’’
x33 ‘‘Very easy’’
Table 12
Values of the criteria weights given by the experts.
g1 g2 g3
Expert 1 1/3 1/3 1/3
Expert 2 0.2 0.3 0.5
Expert 3 0.25 0.5 0.25
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A decision for selecting a site has to be made based on the opinion of a committee composed of three experts referred to
as experts 1, 2 and 3. The coefﬁcients of their relative importance within the group are respectively 0.3, 0.4 and 0.3. We will
assume that the experts use Xu et al.’s method for the decision and that each of them proposes his own values of the criteria
weights. Table 12 gives these values. Moreover, we will suppose that each expert can express individually the assessments
for all the sites with respect to all the criteria and that the evaluations are modeled by BBAs. Tables 13–15 present the BBAs
characterizing the evaluations of the sites given respectively by experts 1, 2 and 3. For instance, the evaluations of site a1 are
established by the experts as follows:
 On criterion g1, experts 1 and 3 hesitate between the third and the fourth assessment grades. They are sure that the
investment costs in this site are average or low without being able to reﬁne their judgment whereas expert 2 is sure that
these costs are average.
 On criterion g2, experts 1 and 3 hesitate between the ﬁrst, the second and the third assessment grades whereas expert 2
hesitates between the third, the fourth and the ﬁfth ones. The formers are sure that the annual operating costs are very
high, high or average whereas the latter is sure that these costs are average, low or very low. The three experts are unable
to reﬁne their judgments.
 On criterion g3, experts 1 and 3 are certain that the access to the hotel is difﬁcult whereas expert 2 is unable to express his
assessment on the site (total ignorance case). That is why the total mass is assigned to the set of assessment grades
X3 ¼ fx31; x32; x33g.
The RBBD concept is applied by each expert to rank, on each criterion, the evaluations of the sites. Two types of single-
criterion preorders can be obtained: the RBBD I and II rankings. In what follows, we will consider the case where the experts
use the RBBD I rankings (RBBD II rankings, resp.) when they apply Xu et al.’s method. Our objective is to compare the results
that will be deduced from these two types of rankings.
Based on the RBBD I (RBBD II, resp.) ranking of the evaluations obtained by each expert, the individual global rankings of
the sites are deduced as in Xu et al.’s method. For that purpose, each expert builds at ﬁrst the two individual total preorders
Of1 and O
f
2 (with f = 1,2, . . . ,s) which are then combined in order to obtain the individual global ranking of the sites O
f. Figs. 4–6
(8–10, resp.) illustrate the RBBD I (RBBD II, resp.) ranking of the evaluations and the individual total and global preorders of
the sites given respectively by experts 1, 2 and 3. Appendixes B, C and D give the belief distances and the global scores with
regard to the ideal and nadir BBAs which are used respectively by experts 1, 2 and 3 to determine the RBBD I and II rankings
of the sites evaluations (let us recall that the comparison to the ideal BBA leads to the same ranking obtained when compar-
ing with regard to the nadir BBA). For instance, let us focus ourselves on the results given by Fig. 4. It is easy to deduce from
the ﬁrst three lines of this ﬁgure that:
Table 13
BBAs characterizing the evaluations of the sites given by expert 1.
g1 g2 g3
a1 m11j1ðfx13gÞ ¼ 0:8
m11j1ðfx13; x14gÞ ¼ 0:2
m21j1ðfx21gÞ ¼ 0:1
m21j1ðfx21; x22; x23gÞ ¼ 0:9
m31j1ðfx31gÞ ¼ 1
a2 m12j1ðfx11gÞ ¼ 0:6
m12j1ðfx11; x12gÞ ¼ 0:4
m22j1ðfx24gÞ ¼ 0:6
m22j1ðfx24; x25gÞ ¼ 0:4
m32j1ðfx32gÞ ¼ 1
a3 m13j1ðfx12gÞ ¼ 1 m23j1ðfx22gÞ ¼ 0:6
m23j1ðfx23gÞ ¼ 0:4
m33j1ðfx32gÞ ¼ 0:7
m33j1ðfx32; x33gÞ ¼ 0:3
a4 m14j1ðfx11; x12; x13; x14gÞ ¼ 1 m24j1ðfx21; x22gÞ ¼ 0:7
m24j1ðfx22; x23gÞ ¼ 0:3
m34j1ðfx32gÞ ¼ 0:8
m34j1ðfx33gÞ ¼ 0:2
a5 m15j1ðfx12gÞ ¼ 1 m25j1ðfx23gÞ ¼ 0:6
m25j1ðfx23; x24gÞ ¼ 0:4
m35j1ðfx31gÞ ¼ 0:9
m35j1ðfx31; x32gÞ ¼ 0:1
Table 14
BBAs characterizing the evaluations of the sites given by expert 2.
g1 g2 g3
a1 m11j2ðfx13gÞ ¼ 1 m21j2ðfx23; x24gÞ ¼ 0:8
m21j2ðfx25gÞ ¼ 0:2
m31j2ðfx31; x32; x33gÞ ¼ 1
a2 m12j2ðfx11; x12gÞ ¼ 1 m22j2ðfx21; x22; x23; x24; x25gÞ ¼ 1 m32j2ðfx32gÞ ¼ 1
a3 m13j2ðfx12gÞ ¼ 0:6
m13j2ðfx13gÞ ¼ 0:4
m23j2ðfx23gÞ ¼ 1 m33j2ðfx32gÞ ¼ 0:7
m33j2ðfx32; x33gÞ ¼ 0:3
a4 m14j2ðfx11gÞ ¼ 1 m24j2ðfx23gÞ ¼ 0:9
m24j2ðfx23; x24gÞ ¼ 0:1
m34j2ðfx32gÞ ¼ 0:8
m34j2ðfx32; x33gÞ ¼ 0:2
a5 m15j2ðfx12gÞ ¼ 1 m25j2ðfx23; x24gÞ ¼ 1 m35j2ðfx31gÞ ¼ 0:5
m35j2ðfx32gÞ ¼ 0:5
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those of a2, a3 and a5 and the evaluations of a1 and a4 are incomparable according to the RBBD I ranking. The worst eval-
uation is the one of a2 (see the ﬁrst line).
 The best evaluation on criterion g2 according to expert 1 is the one of a2 since it is preferred to those of a1, a3, a4 and a5.
The worst evaluations are those of a1 and a4 which are incomparable according to the RBBD I ranking (see the second
line).
 The best evaluations on criterion g3 according to expert 1 are those of a3 anda4 since they are incomparable according to the
RBBD I ranking and they are preferred to those of a1, a2 and a5. The worst evaluation is the one of a1 (see the third line).
The fourth and ﬁfth lines of Fig. 4 give the individual total preorders deduced from the use of Xu et al.’s method in order to
aggregate the RBBD I rankings of the sites evaluations (see the ﬁrst three lines). As can be noticed, the best sites according to
the ﬁrst individual total preorder are a2 and a3 which are indifferent. The best ones according to the second total preorder are
a3 and a4 which are also indifferent. In both preorders, the worst site is a1. These preorders are combined in order to obtain
the individual global ranking of the sites (see the sixth line). It is clear that the best and worst sites are respectively a3 and a1.
Finally, the individual global preorders of the sites O1, O2 and O3 are aggregated in order to obtain a collective global pre-
order that synthesizes the opinions of experts 1, 2 and 3. This is performed using the same procedure of Xu et al.’s method
applied above to obtain the individual global rankings. Therefore, two collective total preorders O1 and O2 are at ﬁrst deter-
mined which are then combined to determine the collective global preorder O. Fig. 7 (11, resp.) gives the collective total and
global preorders of the sites obtained in the case where the experts use the RBBD I (RBBD II, resp.) ranking of the evaluations
in order to obtain the individual global rankings. For instance, the ﬁrst and second lines of Fig. 7 (11, resp.) give the collective
Table 15
BBAs characterizing the evaluations of the sites given by expert 3.
g1 g2 g3
a1 m11j3ðfx13gÞ ¼ 0:94
m11j3ðfx13; x14gÞ ¼ 0:06
m21j3ðfx21gÞ ¼ 0:04
m21j3ðfx23gÞ ¼ 0:6
m21j3ðfx21; x22; x23gÞ ¼ 0:36
m31j3ðfx31gÞ ¼ 1
a2 m12j3ðfx11gÞ ¼ 0:6
m12j3ðfx11; x12gÞ ¼ 0:4
m22j3ðfx24gÞ ¼ 0:6
m22j3ðfx24; x25gÞ ¼ 0:4
m32j3ðfx32gÞ ¼ 1
a3 m13j3ðfx12gÞ ¼ 1 m23j3ðfx22gÞ ¼ 0:33
m23j3ðfx23gÞ ¼ 0:67
m33j3ðfx32gÞ ¼ 0:84
m33j3ðfx32; x33gÞ ¼ 0:16
a4 m14j3ðfx11gÞ ¼ 0:67
m14j3ðfx11; x12; x13; x14gÞ ¼ 0:33
m24j3ðfx21; x22gÞ ¼ 0:44
m24j3ðfx22; x23gÞ ¼ 0:19
m24j3ðfx23gÞ ¼ 0:37
m34j3ðfx32gÞ ¼ 0:9
m34j3ðfx33gÞ ¼ 0:1
a5 m15j3ðfx12gÞ ¼ 1 m25j3ðfx23gÞ ¼ 0:6
m25j3ðfx23; x24gÞ ¼ 0:4
m35j3ðfx31gÞ ¼ 0:9
m35j3ðfx32gÞ ¼ 0:05
m35j3ðfx31; x32gÞ ¼ 0:05
RBBD I ranking of the sites evaluations on 
criterion 1g  given by expert 1 
RBBD I ranking of the sites evaluations on 
criterion 2g  given by expert 1 
RBBD I ranking of the sites evaluations on 
criterion 3g  given by expert 1 
Individual total preorder of the sites 11O  given by 
expert 1  
Individual total preorder of the sites 12O  given by 
expert 1 
Individual global preorder of the sites 1O  given by 
expert 1 a3
a5a2
a1
a4
a2
a3
a4
a1a5
a5
a2
a3
a1a4
a2
a3
a4
a1a5
a5a2
a4a3
a1
a1
a4
a3
a5
a2
Fig. 4. Illustration of the different steps of Xu and Martel’s method based on the RBBD I rankings of the sites evaluations given by expert 1.
M.A. Boujelben et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 52 (2011) 1171–1194 1187total preorders of the sites which are obtained as in Xu et al.’s method by aggregating the individual global preorders of the
sites given in the sixth lines of Figs. 4–6(8–10, resp.). These preorders are combined in order to obtain the collective global
preorder of the sites which is given in the third line of Fig. 7 (11, resp.).
Based on the achieved results given in Figs. 7 and 11, it is easy to see that the best site is a3 according to the collective
global preorders of the sites obtained when the experts use the RBBD I or II rankings of the evaluations. The worst sites
according to the collective global preorder of Fig. 7 are a4 and a5 and according to the one of Fig. 11 are a1 and a5. Moreover,
RBBD I ranking of the sites 
evaluations on criterion 1g  given by 
expert 2 
RBBD I ranking of the sites 
evaluations on criterion 2g  given by 
expert 2 
RBBD I ranking of the sites 
evaluations on criterion 3g  given by 
expert 2 
Individual total preorder of the sites 
2
1O  given by expert 2  
Individual total preorder of the sites 
2
2O  given by expert 2 
Individual global preorder of the sites 
2O  given by expert 2 a4
a1
a3
a5a2
a1 a3 a4 a2 a5
a3 a1 a4 a2 a5
a3 a4 a2 a5
a1
a1 a5 a4 a3
a2
a1 a3 a5 a2 a4
Fig. 5. Illustration of the different steps of Xu and Martel’s method based on the RBBD I rankings of the sites evaluations given by expert 2.
RBBD I ranking of the sites 
evaluations on criterion 1g  given by 
expert 3 
RBBD I ranking of the sites 
evaluations on criterion 2g  given by 
expert 3 
RBBD I ranking of the sites 
evaluations on criterion 3g  given by 
expert 3 
Individual total preorder of the sites 
3
1O  given by expert 3  
Individual total preorder of the sites 
3
2O  given by expert 3 
Individual global preorder of the sites 
3O  given by expert 3 a2 a4a1
a3
a5
a5
a2
a3
a4a1
a2 a5 a3 a1 a4
a2
a3
a4
a1a5
a5a2 a4
a1
a3
a1 a2a4
a3
a5
Fig. 6. Illustration of the different steps of Xu and Martel’s method based on the RBBD I rankings of the sites evaluations given by expert 3.
Collective total preorder of the sites 
1O
Collective total preorder of the sites 
2O
Collective global preorder of the sites 
O a2a3
a4a1
a5
a3 a2 a5 a1 a4
a3 a2 a1 a4 a5
Fig. 7. Collective preorders of the sites in the case where the experts use RBBD I rankings of the evaluations.
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RBBD II ranking of the sites 
evaluations on criterion 1g  given by 
expert 1 
RBBD II ranking of the sites 
evaluations on criterion 2g  given by 
expert 1 
RBBD II ranking of the sites 
evaluations on criterion 3g  given by 
expert 1 
Individual total preorder of the sites 
1
1O  given by expert 1  
Individual total preorder of the sites 
1
2O  given by expert 1 
Individual global preorder of the sites 
1O  given by expert 1 
a4 a3 a2 a5 a1
a4 a3 a2 a5 a1
a4 a3 a2 a5 a1
a4 a3 a2 a5 a1
a2 a5 a3 a1 a4
a4a1 a2
a3
a5
Fig. 8. Illustration of the different steps of Xu and Martel’s method based on the RBBD II rankings of the sites evaluations given by expert 1.
RBBD II ranking of the sites 
evaluations on criterion 1g  given by 
expert 2 
RBBD II ranking of the sites 
evaluations on criterion 2g  given by 
expert 2 
RBBD II ranking of the sites 
evaluations on criterion 3g  given by 
expert 2 
Individual total preorder of the sites 
2
1O  given by expert 2  
Individual total preorder of the sites 
2
2O  given by expert 2 
Individual global preorder of the sites 
2O  given by expert 2 a4
a2
a5
a1
a3
a4a3
a2
a5
a1
a4a1
a2
a5
a3
a4a3 a5
a1
a2
a4a5
a2
a3
a1
a1 a3 a5 a2 a4
Fig. 9. Illustration of the different steps of Xu and Martel’s method based on the RBBD II rankings of the sites evaluations given by expert 2.
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a4, sites a2 and a4 and sites a4 and a5. Indeed:
 a1 (a2, resp.) is preferred to a4 according to the collective global preorder deduced from the aggregationof the individual global
preorders that use RBBD I rankings whereas they are incomparable according to the one based on the RBBD II rankings.
 a4 and a5 are incomparable according to the collective global preorder deduced from the aggregation of the individual
global preorders that use RBBD I rankings whereas a4 is preferred to a5 according to the one based on the RBBD II
rankings.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have addressed ranking problem in uncertain, imprecise and multi-experts contexts. Evidence theory
offers convenient tools to tackle such kind of problems. At ﬁrst, the concept of BBA allows experts to express freely their
assessments and even to represent the total ignorance. In order to rank the BBAs that represent the evaluations of the actions
RBBD II ranking of the sites 
evaluations on criterion 1g  given by 
expert 3 
RBBD II ranking of the sites 
evaluations on criterion 2g  given by 
expert 3 
RBBD II ranking of the sites 
evaluations on criterion 3g  given by 
expert 3 
Individual total preorder of the sites 
3
1O  given by expert 3  
Individual total preorder of the sites 
3
2O  given by expert 3 
Individual global preorder of the sites 
3O  given by expert 3 
a2 a5 a3 a1 a4
a2 a5 a3 a1 a4
a2 a5 a3 a1 a4
a4 a3 a2 a5 a1
a2 a5 a3 a1 a4
a1 a2a4
a3
a5
Fig. 10. Illustration of the different steps of Xu and Martel’s method based on the RBBD II rankings of the sites evaluations given by expert 3.
Collective total preorder of the sites 
1O
Collective total preorder of the sites 
2O
Collective global preorder of the sites 
O a3
a1a2
a4 a5
a3 a2 a1 a4 a5
a3 a4 a2 a5 a1
Fig. 11. Collective preorders of the sites in the case where the experts use RBBD II rankings of the evaluations.
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nadir BBAs using belief distances. Two rankings can be deduced called RBBD I and II which give respectively partial and total
preorders of the BBAs. In addition, a model inspired by Xu et al.’s method has been proposed and illustrated on a pedagogical
example.
We have shown that the RBBD concept is coherent with the ﬁrst belief dominance approach. Moreover, we have proven
that the number of incomparable pairs of BBAs in the RBBD I ranking is usually inferior or equal to the one in the ranking
deduced by using the ﬁrst belief dominance to rank the BBAs. At this point, let us note that the RBBD I ranking can be viewed
as a mid-way between the RBBD II ranking and the preorder given by the ﬁrst belief dominance. Indeed, whereas the former
can lead to excessive rich results (a ranking without incomparabilities), the latter can lead on the contrary to poor results
since an important number of incomparable pairs of BBAs can be induced.
Finally, we have illustrated the beneﬁts of using evidence theory in ranking problems. Of course, there are still
many directions for future research. Among others, we can mention the development of combination rules that
respect the unanimity principle. Moreover, it is of course interesting to compare the results given by the RBBD I and
II rankings. The RBBD II provides an ‘‘agreeable’’ ranking of the BBAs, but some useful information about incomparabil-
ities gets lost.
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cept. Let us note that the proof of this proposition can be performed based on the belief distances to the nadir BBA and the
deﬁnitions given in formula 15.
Proof 6. According to Proof 5, ifmhi FBDm
h
i0 ; d Bel
h
i
!
;Belhideal
! !
6 d Belhi0
!
;Belhideal
! !
and d Belhi
 
;Belhideal
  !
6 d Belhi0
 
;Belhideal
  !
. There-
fore, if mhi FBDm
h
i0 , we have one of the following cases:
 d Belhi
!
;Belhideal
! !
6 d Belhi0
!
;Belhideal
! !
and d Belhi
 
;Belhideal
  !
> d Belhi0
 
;Belhideal
  !
;
 d Belhi
!
;Belhideal
! !
> d Belhi0
!
;Belhideal
! !
and d Belhi
 
;Belhideal
  !
6 d Belhi0
 
;Belhideal
  !
;
 d Belhi
!
;Belhideal
! !
P d Belhi0
!
;Belhideal
! !
and d Belhi
 
;Belhideal
  !
< d Belhi0
 
;Belhideal
  !
;
 d Belhi
!
;Belhideal
! !
< d Belhi0
!
;Belhideal
! !
and d Belhi
 
;Belhideal
  !
P d Belhi0
 
;Belhideal
  !
.
Based on the deﬁnitions given in formula 14, it follows that ifmhi FBDm
h
i0 , thenm
h
i Phm
h
i0 orm
h
i Jhm
h
i0 orm
h
i P
1
h m
h
i0 according to
the RBBD concept. This result leads to deduce that when mhi FBDm
h
i0 and m
h
i0FBDm
h
i ; m
h
i Phm
h
i0 or m
h
i Jhm
h
i0 or m
h
i P
1
h m
h
i0 . In other
words, when mhi and m
h
i0 are incomparable according to the ﬁrst belief dominance, m
h
i Phm
h
i0 or m
h
i Jhm
h
i0 or m
h
i P
1
h m
h
i0 according
to the RBBD concept. Therefore, the number of incomparabilities obtained by the ﬁrst belief dominance approach is superior
or equal to the one obtained by the RBBD concept (RBBD II).
Appendix B. Belief distances used by expert 1 to determine the RBBD I and II rankings of the evaluations
Tables 16–18
Table 16
Belief distances used by expert 1 on criterion g1.
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
d Bel1ij1
!
;Bel1idealj1
! ! 1.8 3.6 3 1 3
d Bel1ij1
 
;Bel1idealj1
  ! 2 4 3 4 3
a1ij1 3.8 7.6 6 5 6
d Bel1ij1
!
;Bel1nadirj1
! ! 2.2 0.4 1 3 1
d Bel1ij1
 
;Bel1nadirj1
  ! 2 0 1 0 1
b1ij1 4.4 0.4 2 3 2
Table 18
Belief distances used by expert 1 on criterion g3.
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
d Bel3ij1
!
;Bel3idealj1
! ! 2 1 0.7 0.8 1.9
d Bel3ij1
 
;Bel3idealj1
  ! 2 1 1 0.8 2
a3ij1 4 2 1.7 1.6 3.9
d Bel3ij1
!
;Bel3nadirj1
! ! 0 1 1.3 1.2 0.1
d Bel3ij1
 
;Bel3nadirj1
  ! 0 1 1 1.2 0
b3ij1 0 2 2.3 2.4 0.1
Table 17
Belief distances used by expert 1 on criterion g2.
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
d Bel2ij1
!
;Bel2idealj1
! ! 2.2 0.6 2.6 2.7 1.6
d Bel2ij1
 
;Bel2idealj1
  ! 4 1 2.6 3.7 2
a2ij1 6.2 1.6 5.2 6.4 3.6
d Bel2ij1
!
;Bel2nadirj1
! ! 1.8 3.4 1.4 1.3 2.4
d Bel2ij1
 
;Bel2nadirj1
  ! 0 3 1.4 0.3 2
b2ij1 1.8 6.4 2.8 1.6 4.4
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Tables 19–21Table 19
Belief distances used by expert 2 on criterion g1.
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
d Bel1ij2
!
;Bel1idealj2
! ! 2 3 2.6 4 3
d Bel1ij2
 
;Bel1idealj2
  ! 2 4 2.6 4 3
a1ij2 4 7 5.2 8 6
d Bel1ij2
!
;Bel1nadirj2
! ! 2 1 1.4 0 1
d Bel1ij2
 
;Bel1nadirj2
  ! 2 0 1.4 0 1
b1ij2 4 1 2.8 0 2
Table 20
Belief distances used by expert 2 on criterion g2.
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
d Bel2ij2
!
;Bel2idealj2
! ! 0.8 0 2 1.9 1
d Bel2ij2
 
;Bel2idealj2
  ! 1.6 4 2 2 2
a2ij2 2.4 4 4 3.9 3
d Bel2ij2
!
;Bel2nadirj2
! ! 3.2 4 2 2.1 3
d Bel2ij2
 
;Bel2nadirj2
  ! 2.4 0 2 2 2
b2ij2 5.6 4 4 4.1 5
Table 21
Belief distances used by expert 2 on criterion g3.
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
d Bel3ij2
!
;Bel3idealj2
! ! 0 1 0.7 0.8 1.5
d Bel3ij2
 
;Bel3idealj2
  ! 2 1 1 1 1.5
a3ij2 2 2 1.7 1.8 3
d Bel3ij2
!
;Bel3nadirj2
! ! 2 1 1.3 1.2 0.5
d Bel3ij2
 
;Bel3nadirj2
  ! 0 1 1 1 0.5
b3ij2 2 2 2.3 2.2 1
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Tables 22–24Table 22
Belief distances used by expert 3 on criterion g1.
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
d Bel1ij3
!
;Bel1idealj3
! ! 1.94 3.6 3 3.01 3
d Bel1ij3
 
;Bel1idealj3
  ! 2 4 3 4 3
a1ij3 3.94 7.6 6 7.01 6
d Bel1ij3
!
;Bel1nadirj3
! ! 2.06 0.4 1 0.99 1
d Bel1ij3
 
;Bel1nadirj3
  ! 2 0 1 0 1
b1ij3 4.06 0.4 2 0.99 2
Table 23
Belief distances used by expert 3 on criterion g2.
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
d Bel2ij3
!
;Bel2idealj3
! ! 2.08 0.6 2.33 2.44 1.6
d Bel2ij3
 
;Bel2idealj3
  ! 2.8 1 2.33 3.07 2
a2ij3 4.88 1.6 4.66 5.51 3.6
d Bel2ij3
!
;Bel2nadirj3
! ! 1.92 3.4 1.67 1.56 2.4
d Bel2ij3
 
;Bel2nadirj3
  ! 1.2 3 1.67 0.93 2
b2ij3 3.12 6.4 3.34 2.49 4.4
Table 24
Belief distances used by expert 3 on criterion g3.
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
d Bel3ij3
!
;Bel3idealj3
! ! 2 1 0.84 0.9 1.9
d Bel3ij3
 
;Bel3idealj3
  ! 2 1 1 0.9 1.95
a3ij3 4 2 1.84 1.8 3.85
d Bel3ij3
!
;Bel3nadirj3
! ! 0 1 1.16 1.1 0.1
d Bel3ij3
 
;Bel3nadirj3
  ! 0 1 1 1.1 0.05
b3ij3 0 2 2.16 2.2 0.15
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